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Introduction
Psychopathy is one of the most studied and recognized psychiatric diag-
noses in mental health research (Hare, Neumann, and Widiger 2012). 
The clinical prototype of a psychopathic patient includes traits of grave 
antisocial conduct, pathological lying, and a callous lack of empathy 
(e.g. Cooke, Hart, Logan, and Michie 2012). Relatedly, psychopaths are 
believed to be overrepresented in the criminal populace. Whereas psycho-
paths are estimated to make up about 1 percent of the general popula-
tion, it is projected that some 30 percent of all incarcerated individuals 
might be psychopaths (Hare and Neumann 2008). As a result of these 
estimates, the psychopathy diagnosis has predominantly been researched 
and applied in forensic settings, yielding actuarial non-trivial informa-
tion about behavior prediction, risk evaluation, treatment amenability, 
institutional placement, parole decision, etc. (e.g. Gacono 2016; Hare, 
Black, and Walsh 2013).
While many of the traits associated with psychopathy also overlap 
with other personality and conduct disorders (e.g. Crego and Widiger 
2015), psychopaths are nevertheless considered importantly unique on 
a number of parameters. One such central difference is the prevailing 
belief that—different from most psychiatric conditions—psychopathy is 
an essentially chronic, untreatable disorder (e.g. Hare et al. 2013). For 
example, in a survey of Swedish forensic practitioners (n = 90), Sörman 
et al. (2014) found that participants generally endorsed the view that (a) 
psychopaths cannot change, (b) that there is no treatment that can cure 
a psychopath, and (c) that criminal psychopaths cannot be rehabilitated 
(2014, 411). These findings were consistent with a 1993 survey of UK 
forensic practitioners (n = 515) that found that only 1 percent thought 
that psychopathic personality was always remediable; most answered 
that only in some cases could patients benefit from treatment (Tennent, 
Tennent, Prins, and Bedford 1993).
The view that psychopaths are immune to various forms of psychiatric 
intervention and rehabilitation is not a new development, but echoes a 
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long-standing truism in the research history (e.g. Cleckley 1988; Hare 
1998; Harris and Rice 2006; Maibom 2014; McCord and McCord 1964; 
Suedfeld and Landon 1978). Presumably as an effect of these beliefs, 
researchers have reported on widespread evidence that the psychiatric 
diagnosis is generally applied, not as an indicator of psychiatric treat-
ment, but moreover as a discriminator for treatment and rehabilitation 
programs (e.g. Polaschek and Skeem 2018). As was recently argued by a 
team of leading researchers, forensic practitioners are better off consider-
ing management a more appropriate goal than treatment when dealing 
with psychopathic patients, given that there is “no evidence that treat-
ment programs results in a change in the personality structure of psycho-
pathic individuals” (Hare et al. 2013, 244–245).
Mirroring a growing sentiment among researchers, this contribution 
argues that the untreatability view about psychopaths is medically erro-
neous due to insufficient support of scientific data. Moreover, the aggre-
gate of recent research appears to paint a comparatively more optimistic 
picture of psychopaths’ response to psychiatric intervention. Such a per-
spective, if reasonable, raises novel ethical concerns expedient to the field 
of forensic psychiatry; for example, whether the clinical narrative and 
forensic practice concerning psychopathy meets the ethical standards for 
proper psychiatric professionalism. Speaking to this suspicion, new cau-
tionary directions for future practices and research are discussed.
The Psychopathy Diagnosis and Its  
Forensic Application
The psychopathy diagnosis is arguably among the historically and cur-
rently most researched psychiatric conditions (Hare, Neumann, and 
Widiger 2012), and as a result, its research paradigm has become an 
increasingly large and challenging affair to navigate. These complexi-
ties are further amplified by pop-cultural and unscientific anecdotes that 
surround the field, colorfully portraying psychopaths as vile intraspe-
cies predators, sometimes deviating wildly from the basic tenets of the 
empirical research (e.g. Berg et al. 2013). Thus, one strategy for a sober 
and informative discussion of psychopathy research is to start with some 
basic perspectives in terms of what exactly psychopathy is and is not.
It should be noticed that psychopathy is not an “official” psychiatric 
diagnosis in the sense that its details are recognized by the broader psy-
chiatric community. For instance, the diagnosis is not explicitly included 
in the latest (fifth) edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Instead, the DSM-5 includes canonical 
psychopathic personality traits as specifier criteria under the diagnosis 
of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), ostensibly cataloging psy-
chopathy as a subcategory to ASPD (for a discussion of the differences, 
see Crego and Widiger 2014). This should not necessarily be seen as 
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a problematic aspect, though. Some researchers have argued that our 
understanding of psychopathy has greatly surpassed our understand-
ing of ASPD, since the majority of research efforts (and funding) has 
migrated away from ASPD to the psychopathy diagnosis (e.g. Gacono 
2016; Hare and Neumann 2008).
More fundamentally, though, classificatory descriptions of psychopa-
thy in the psychiatric nomenclature can vary depending on the research-
ers we consult. For instance, some describe psychopathy as a personality 
disorder, others as a clinical construct, and some have argued that psy-
chopathy is merely an adaptive lifestyle (e.g. Glenn, Kurzban, and Raine 
2011; Hart and Cook 2012). In addition to these perspectives, the many 
different scientific theoretical accounts of the diagnosis are multifaceted. 
For instance, some posit psychopathy to be a cognitive disability, and 
others think it is an impairment of emotion dispositions (for a discussion 
of the contemporary accounts, see Brazil and Cima 2016). While these 
disagreements in the field are substantial, a more generous interpreta-
tion might be that they reflect a growing suspicion among researchers 
that psychopathy is a much more heterogenous disorder than previously 
assumed; that the diagnosis might consist of, or be divided into several 
sub-types (e.g. Hicks and Drislane 2018) with varying underlying etiolo-
gies (e.g. Jurjako and Malatesti 2018; Stratton, Kiehl, and Hanlon 2015).
However, aside from these divergences, the more fundamental motiva-
tion for applying the diagnosis is that the diagnosis itself aims at signify-
ing a common patient stereotype encountered in the psychiatric clinic. 
That is, over the decades of psychiatric professional practices, clini-
cians have come to a sort of consensus that there exists a specific class 
of patients who demonstrate a peculiar constellation of personality and 
behavior; namely, a markedly callous personality disposition (e.g. lack of 
empathy, glibness, grandiosity) and strong antisocial tendencies (e.g. vio-
lence, pathological lying, impulsivity). These are the concrete individuals 
that clinicians aim to demarcate when they apply the term psychopathy 
(i.e. regardless of whether they see it as a disorder, construct, or some-
thing else).
More decisively, though, the majority of researchers generally agree 
that the syndromic constellation of so-called psychopathic traits is a sign 
of abnormality, positing that the homogeneity of observed traits across 
this particular “patient class” is caused by a discrete and shared underly-
ing etiology (or a suite of different, yet discrete etiologies). Importantly, 
psychopaths are not seen as merely ill-behaved people with a socially 
appalling character. Certainly, there is not necessarily something psycho-
logically abnormal about being deceitful and violent; we might even say 
this is what eventually differentiated Homo sapiens from other mammals 
(e.g. Wolin 1963). Rather, when psychologists refer to psychopathy as a 
psychiatric diagnosis, what is conveyed is a claim about a discrete con-
dition or symptom, hypothesized to be caused by one or more likewise 
Psychopathy Treatment 265
discrete etiological mechanisms (e.g. genes, neurobiological structures, 
cognitive functions, emotion deprivations, etc.) (e.g. Hare and Neu-
mann 2008). Thus, when average people are deceitful and violent, this 
would be different from when psychopaths are so, since their behavior 
is caused/premediated by their psychological abnormality. Furthermore, 
this hypothesis also substantiates the larger forensic and criminological 
interest in psychopathy insofar that if psychopathy has discrete etiologi-
cal mechanisms, we might be able to intervene medically with the violent 
antisocial behavior allegedly associated with psychopathy (e.g. Reidy 
et al. 2015).
When we speak of the field of psychopathy research, then, what we are 
really referring to is a largely coordinated scientific effort to corroborate 
this main hypothesis: that the observed patient stereotype makes up a 
homogenous class of individuals, undergirded by one or more discrete 
etiologies.3 Although this research effort is multifaceted, it can be roughly 
divided into three interrelated, yet independent, research efforts: (1) the-
oretically accounting for what exactly makes psychopaths’ psychology 
abnormal compared to normal individuals (e.g. Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 
2005; Fowles and Dindo 2006; Hamilton and Newman 2018); (2) empir-
ically measuring the etiological mechanisms of psychopathy (e.g. Fergu-
son 2010; Stratton, Kiehl, and Hanlon 2015; Werner, Few, and Bucholz 
2015); (3) and an applied effort to build reliable and valid assessment 
tools capable of distinguishing psychopaths from non-psychopaths in the 
populace (e.g. Hare 2003; Lilienfeld and Widows 2005; Patrick, Fowles, 
and Krueger 2009).
In light of these different efforts, one common ground of confusion 
when speaking about psychopathy is when the various branches of 
research are conflated or mistaken with one another; for example, when 
(1) theoretical accounts of psychopathy are conflated with (3) the work 
of building valid assessment tools. Indeed, the former is concerned with 
accounting for the mechanics behind observed traits, while the latter 
regards the methods to reliably and validly demarcate psychopaths from 
non-psychopaths based on observable traits. Analogously, this example 
equals comparing theoretical studies of diabetes (e.g. accounting for the 
mechanics of cellular abnormalities in the pancreatic islets) with the diag-
nostic testing for diabetes (e.g. measuring blood sugar levels). Although 
the two are importantly related, they are obviously two very different 
things. The former regards what diabetes is, while the latter is a proxy 
measure of diabetes. Conflating the former into the other in psychopa-
thy research and practices will result in the mistaken belief that a psy-
chopathy measure is psychopathy (indeed, a common misconception, e.g. 
Skeem and Cooke [2010]).
Why is this nuance important? Because most of the times when the 
psychopathy diagnosis is introduced in forensic settings, what is really 
being discussed is (3) the measure of psychopathy. And as it is with all 
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forms of psychiatric diagnostic assessments, there exists the very real pos-
sibility that the individuals we measure to have psychopathy are, in fact, 
not psychopaths (i.e. that they do not carry the hypothesized etiology). In 
such cases, we would be dealing with false positives, and many of our sci-
entific inferences that we make about the psychiatric condition would not 
apply to the patient. It equals falsely asserting that a person has diabetes 
based on irregularities in blood sugar levels, which likewise would make 
him/her respond very differently to insulin injections (for a discussion of 
such false positives in psychopathy research, see: Larsen 2018; Skeem 
and Cooke 2010).
This point should not be taken easily, since there are good reasons to 
believe that our psychiatric assessments in general yield a high number 
of such inaccurate diagnoses. Compared to biomedical diagnostic assess-
ment tools, say, a test for diabetes, psychiatric assessment tools are much 
less accurate for a number of reasons. First, researchers broadly disagree 
on how exactly to account for an alleged disorder (i.e. theoretical disa-
greement). Second, research in psychiatric etiology is scarce and ambigu-
ous (i.e. disagreement and unfamiliarity about causality). Third, because 
of theoretical disagreement and lack of etiological insight, the assessment 
tools being developed will naturally have fundamental inbuilt uncertain-
ties. For instance, when we do not have a clear theoretical understanding 
of a disorder, let alone know its cause(s), it trivially follows that we can-
not know with certainty that our assessments measure what they pur-
port to measure. While it is obvious that many medical disorders seem 
straightforward to measure even in the absence of theoretical and etio-
logical insight (e.g. scientists were relatively accurate when demarcating 
diabetic patients before they knew what diabetes was), psychiatric condi-
tions are presumably theoretically and etiologically more complex, and 
its signs and symptoms relatively more elusive than “somatic” disorders. 
So, where a traditional biomedical diagnostic method (e.g. measuring 
diabetes) yields a surprisingly high number of false diagnoses notwith-
standing its comparatively high accuracy rates,4 we can soundly assume 
that psychiatric tools are comparatively much more erroneous due to 
both the basic nature and our epistemic limitations about what we are 
measuring.
With this cautionary note on psychiatric diagnostics in mind, the term 
“diagnosed psychopath” shall in the following refer to a person who 
meets the, so to speak, clinical standard or threshold of psychopathy, 
namely, a person who has been assessed to be psychopathic with official 
field-specific assessment tools.
The most widely used psychopathy assessment method is the Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (R. D. Hare 2003) (see Figure 
14.1). The PCL-R consists of 20 trait items, of which 18 load on two fac-
tors (and four facets). The assessment is carried out by analyzing patient 
records and conducting a semi-structured interview with the patient, 
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scoring each of the 20 items from 0–2 points. The score zero is given 
if the trait is not present in the patient; score 1 if the trait is partially 
present; or score 2 if the trait is a stable mark of the patient. Thus, the 
PCL-R score ranges from 0–40, where a conventionally decided cut-
off score of a proper diagnosis is understood to be somewhere between 
25–30 points. The diagnostic cut-off, however, is not implied as a hard 
line between psychopathic and non-psychopathic. Instead, the psychopa-
thy diagnosis is broadly considered to be dimensional, where a score is 
better representative of the level of psychopathy in a patient (i.e. score 40 
is considered “full blown” psychopathy) (for a peer-reviewed discussion 
of the PCL-R as a valid diagnostic tool, see: Hare and Neumann 2008).
One of the advantages of the PCL-R is its clinical reliability, i.e. the 
extent to which two or more clinicians independently give the same 
patient a similar score (e.g. Blais, Forth, and Hare 2017). This makes the 
PCL-R particularly apt at discerning the patient class (i.e. so-called psy-
chopaths) based on the aforementioned observable traits. Notice, again, 
that this does not mean that the PCL-R selects actual psychopaths (i.e. 
those who carry the hypothesized etiologies). It merely means that, if we 
take a random group of people, the PCL-R can reliably pinpoint which 
individuals belong, so to speak, to the patient class.
Because of this reliability, the PCL-R has been considerably effective in 
actuarial scientific research, measuring specific behavioral tendencies cor-
related with the patient class across various demographics. For example, 
Fail to accept responsibility
Affective
Antisocial
Interpersonal
Lifestyle
Glib/superficial
Grandiose self-worth
Pathological lying
Conning manipulative
Stimulation seeking
Impulsivity
Irresponsible
Parasitic orientation
Lack of realistic goals
Lack of remorse/guilt
Shallow affect
Callous lack of empathy
Poor behavior controls
Early behavior problems
Juvenile delinquency
Revocation of cond. release
Criminal versatility
Factor 1
Factor 2
Figure 14.1  The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, two-factor and four-
facet model (adapted from: Hare and Neumann 2008). In addition 
to these 18 factor-correlated traits, the PCL-R also includes: Many 
short-term marital relationships and promiscuous sexual behavior; 
although these two traits do not load on any factor, they are never-
theless believed to depict a shared characteristic of the patient class.
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one forensically useful type of information that can be derived from 
applying the PCL-R is its correlation with violent recidivism in the crimi-
nal populace (e.g. Serin, Brown, and Wolf 2016; Yang, Wong, and Coid 
2010). Thus, when we point to such correlations, what is really commu-
nicated is a data-driven statistical probability about future behavior (e.g. 
violence) insofar that one belongs to a reliably demarcated patient class. 
This process is methodologically identical to how, say, an insurance com-
pany calculates the risk of driver accident probability; namely, associat-
ing the assessed person with generalized data on specific traits, e.g. age, 
gender, address, occupation, etc. (e.g. Serin et al. 2016).
It is primarily because of such actuarial data-driven efforts that the 
psychopathy diagnosis has gained its reputation as a legitimate tool 
for forensic application, not only for violence prediction, but also on a 
suite of other related issues, such as (though not limited to): child cus-
tody hearings, parole hearings, capital sentencing hearings, preventative 
detention, culpability, institutional placement, and treatment amenability 
(DeMatteo et al. 2014a, 2014b; Edens and Cox 2012; Hare et al. 2013; 
Walsh and Walsh 2006).
Treating the “Untreatable”
One particularly widespread usage of the psychopathy diagnosis (e.g., 
a PCL-R assessment) is to introduce it when making decisions regard-
ing psychiatric treatment and rehabilitation program placements. In this 
context, a high psychopathy score (e.g., 25 or higher on the PCL-R) will 
thus be interpreted as indicating unamiable qualities in terms of success-
ful treatment outcomes, which may then bar such a person from entering 
said programs (e.g., Polaschek and Skeem 2018). This practice expresses 
a deep clinical pessimism about diagnosed psychopaths insofar as the 
diagnosis is not invoked for treatment purposes, but, instead, for justi-
fying clinical passivity (i.e., mere clinical management). In this section, 
the validity of the so-called clinical pessimism surmounting diagnosed 
psychopaths will be reviewed, demonstrating that the belief is scarcely 
supported by the scientific research. Such a finding raises pressing ethical 
concerns for forensic psychiatrists, which will be discussed in the final 
section.
The clinical pessimism concerning psychopathy is not only alive and 
well today, but has arguably been the prevailing view for the better part 
of the research history. One of the founders of contemporary psychopa-
thy theories, Hervey Cleckley, famously characterized the paradoxical 
nature of treating psychopaths. In his five-edition opus, The Mask of San-
ity (first published in 1941), Cleckley spent several pages musing about 
the difficulties of treating psychopathic patients. According to Cleck-
ley, one peculiarity about psychopaths was that, contrary to his other 
psychiatric patients, psychopaths did not appear to find their attitudes 
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and behaviors problematic, let alone psychologically vexing—to Cleck-
ley (2015) a strong indicator of futility in treatment efforts (26–32). 
Although Cleckley actually concluded his work with a hair of optimism 
on future treatment options, his overall assumption about the current 
state of clinical efforts was short and dire: there is not really much that 
can be done (p. 439).5
The clinical pessimism also made it into the single most read and cited 
book about psychopathy, Robert Hare’s 1993 Without Conscience, 
which concludes with a snub:
Many writers on the subject have commented that the shortest chap-
ter in any book on psychopathy should be the one on treatment. 
A one-sentence conclusion such as, “no effective treatment has been 
found,” or, “nothing works,” is the common wrap-up to scholarly 
reviews of the literature.
(Hare 1993, 194)6
Along these lines, the PCL-R manual—which makes up the foundation 
of the professional training of clinicians administering the PCL-R diag-
noses—includes a similarly unenthusiastic section on treatment efforts 
(Hare 2003, 158–162). Here, the leading narrative is that, in general, 
“clinicians and researchers are rightly pessimistic about the treatabil-
ity of psychopaths with traditional methods” (p. 158). But, on top of 
this, the PCL-R manual also emphasizes a discomforting phenomenon 
in treatment research; namely, that diagnosed psychopaths have shown 
iatrogenic, or adverse reactions, to treatment efforts. Treatment actually 
makes them more antisocial, prompting institutional violence and post-
release recidivism.
The particular study mentioned in the PCL-R manual showing adverse 
effects is a retrospective follow-up study by Rice, Harris, and Corm-
ier (1992). This research examined the recidivism rates of 176 treated 
offenders and 146 untreated offenders from a maximum-security institu-
tion over the course of 10.5 years. Among these patients were 92 diag-
nosed psychopaths, of which 46 received treatment (i.e. an intensive 
therapeutic community treatment program [e.g. Barker 1980]). Expect-
edly, the study found a significant difference in the general recidivism 
rates between psychopaths and non-psychopaths. However, the more 
interesting (and surprising) finding was that violent recidivism rates were 
substantially larger for treated psychopaths (77 percent), compared to 
non-treated psychopaths (55 percent). As such, violent recidivism was 
positively (i.e., adversely) associated with treatment efforts in diagnosed 
psychopaths. The study concluded on a speculative note: that community 
treatment programs that generally seek to cultivate pro-social empathic 
and caring qualities might inadvertently make psychopaths better 
equipped to “facilitate the manipulation and exploitation of others” and 
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such treatment efforts could, therefore, be “associated with novel ways 
to commit violent crime” (Rice et al. 1992, 409).
The study by Rice, Harris and Cormier (1992) was based on a relatively 
small number of patients with a specifically non-diverse demographic, 
yielding unique and surprising results. Therefore, its generalizability 
should have been interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the impact of 
the study has turned out to be nothing short of profound. As was noted 
in a review of the treatment literature on psychopathy, the study by Rice 
and colleagues effectively “slammed the lid shut for many on the advis-
ability of even attempting treatment” (Polaschek and Daly 2013, 195).
Despite their own, and a community-wide, inability to replicate these 
adverse effect findings, the authors accentuated their conclusion in a 2006 
review article of the psychopathy treatment literature (Harris and Rice 
2006). In conclusion, they highlighted their 1992 findings, emphasizing 
that there was no compelling evidence for positive treatment outcomes of 
psychopaths, and that there were potential adverse outcomes of treating 
psychopaths: “We believe that the reason for these findings is that psy-
chopaths are fundamentally different from other offenders and that there 
is nothing ‘wrong’ with them in the manner of a deficit or impairment 
that therapy can ‘fix’. Instead, they exhibit an evolutionarily viable life 
strategy that involves lying, cheating, and manipulating others” (Harris 
and Rice 2006, 568). The larger point is that actual treatment might be 
too optimistic; instead, practitioners should focus on managing the anti-
social patterns of diagnosed psychopaths. Hence, practitioners should 
use the psychopathy diagnosis as a discriminator for clinical treatment.
If we pause for a moment and consider these adverse effect perspec-
tives, they should, as a minimum, give ground to critical suspicion. One 
initial problem is that, while we might be satisfied with the claim that 
the patient class selected by using the PCL-R potentially could be asso-
ciated with adverse treatment effects, the way researchers here seem to 
qualify this view is, not with a reference to a patient class, but, rather, 
with reference to an underlying belief about the nature of psychopathy. 
But if it is the etiological aspect—i.e., psychopathy proper—that is cor-
related with adverse effects, we are left wondering how exactly this effect 
can be strongly correlated with a patient class that, all things consid-
ered, must include a great number of false positives. It is important to 
emphasize that, when we make actuarial projections based on a patient 
class (e.g. PCL-R score >25), these projections are entirely mute to any 
theory about underlying etiology (i.e., the actuarial claim is in and by 
itself a mere statistical observation). It therefore amounts to a logical leap 
of faith when these claims are translated into a narrative about adverse 
effects due to etiology that recommends management over treatment for 
the entire patient class (e.g. Hare et al. 2013). It is not that such claims 
are unintelligible from a hypothetical standpoint, though; it is, rather, 
that they seem insufficiently paired with critical scrutiny.
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However, another problem with this narrative about untreatability 
and adverse treatment effects is that it is simply not supported by the 
overall research data, or, at least, the evidence in support of the wide-
spread clinical pessimism is greatly disproportionate to the extent of the 
claim. For one, the study by Rice, Harris, and Cormier (1992)—which 
arguably serves as the most compelling, fundamental evidence in favor 
of clinical pessimism—was based on patients undergoing an infamously 
problematic treatment program at the Oak Ridge Social Therapy Unit in 
Ontario, Canada. The treatment program was so harrowing that a class 
lawsuit was raised against the institution and its practitioners in 2000. In 
May 2017, a Canadian judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, comparing 
the alleged treatment to torture (Barker v. Barker 2017; Fine 2017).7 The 
details of the lawsuit confirmed widespread denigrating treatment proce-
dures, such as chaining nude patients together for up to two weeks, keep-
ing patients locked up in windowless rooms, feeding patients liquid food 
through tubes in the wall, experimenting with hallucinogens and delirium-
producing drugs, and a complete disrespect and rejection of patient rights 
(Berg et al. 2013; D’Silva, Duggan, and McCarthy 2004; Ronson 2011).
In a 2016 interview, a former (recidivating) psychopathic patient from 
Oak Ridge, Jim Motherall, said that, when he was released from the 
institution in 1976, he was literally broken down and dysfunctional: 
“I wasn’t ready to be on the street, I couldn’t function on the street 
[. . .] I was angry. I hated them [the practitioners]. I hated what they 
did, I hated what they stood for. And I couldn’t control the anger. I had 
lost any ability to get hold of that anger” (Sherren 2016). To Motherall, 
and presumably many of his fellow patients forced through the torturous 
“treatment” program, that anger led to multiple violent offences after his 
release, and decades of additional confinement.
The remaining question is, of course, whether (psychopathic) patients 
such as Motherall had their hypothesized condition exacerbated and, 
therefore, recidivated faster and more violently, or whether the violent 
frequencies were a result of some other factors related to their treatment. 
To answer this question in an accurate scientific manner, we would have 
to look closer at the psychological profiles of each recidivating patient 
and also know the details of the exact treatment program they under-
went. For example, perhaps we would find that only certain personal-
ity traits (and not PCL-R psychopathy as such) were correlated strongly 
with elevated aggression. Unfortunately, such details are not present in 
the research data of Rice, Harris and Cormier (1992), nor have we seen 
any serious efforts in re-evaluating the research conclusion in light of the 
malpractice disclosure; for example, either retracting the study or further 
qualifying the data collection, methods, research results, etc. (which, of 
course, is common practice when the integrity of a study is compromised).
But perhaps asking these questions about adverse effects, let alone try-
ing to answer them, is also rather futile. For instance, Polaschek and 
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Tadgh (2013) have argued that there is ample evidence that, in gener-
alized and trivial ways, some treatment methods can potentially gener-
ate adverse outcomes in any patient class regardless of psychological 
disorder (e.g. Lilienfeld 2007; Skeem, Polaschek, and Manchak 2009). 
However, this is qualitatively different from claiming that specific treat-
ment efforts (e.g. concrete maltreatment), or more profoundly, conven-
tional treatment, generally makes diagnosed psychopaths at higher risk 
of recidivating—a grand view that needs more evidence than what can 
be drawn from a single compromised study (Polaschek and Daly 2013, 
595). So far, Rice et al. (1992) remains the only cited evidence for the 
belief about adverse-effects,8 raising the question why it continues to play 
a significant role in the treatment literature.
Notwithstanding the discussion of potential adverse effects, there is 
actually evidence suggesting that the overall clinical pessimistic conclu-
sions about psychopaths are too precarious. The first study to suggest 
this was by Robert Salekin (2002), who reviewed 42 treatment studies, 
positing the unambiguous conclusion that the clinical pessimism asso-
ciated with psychopathy has little scientific basis. Salekin highlighted a 
number of aggravating factors; mentioning a few should suffice. First, the 
study found a clear lack of valid generalizable data. For instance, out of 
the 42 studies, only four studies (9 percent) were based on the PCL-R, 
raising the question whether the different studies were actually studying 
individuals with the same traits/condition (i.e. unknown diagnostic com-
patibility). Second, although treatment outcomes varied greatly across 
studies, only one study reported adverse effects; namely, the study by 
Rice and colleagues (1992). This suggested to Salekin—presumably una-
ware that this treatment method would later be described as torture by 
a Canadian court—that the specific program of therapeutic community 
treatment administered by that particular institution was only possibly 
worsening the psychopathy condition (p. 105).
Curiously, although Salekin (2002) was arguably the most comprehen-
sive large-scale review of the treatment literature of its time,9 the publica-
tion of the second edition of the PCL-R in 2003 barely mentions these 
findings, merely declaring that: “Although some reviewers (e.g., Salekin 
2002) have suggested that clinical pessimism might be replaced with 
clinical optimism, most clinicians and researchers are rightly pessimistic 
about the treatability of psychopaths with traditional methods” (Hare 
2003, 158). Thus, even though there was poor scientific basis for making 
such a claim—as demonstrated by Salekin (2002)—the creators of the 
PCL-R manual continued to insist on the speculative perspective that:
Some clinicians and administrators hold the uncritical view that psy-
chopaths who have participated in prison treatment programs must 
have derived some benefit. This may help to lull the criminal justice 
system and the public into the false belief that the psychopaths with 
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whom they must deal have derived tangible benefits from treatment, 
simply because they and their therapist say so. Many psychopaths 
take part in all sorts of prison treatment programs, put on a good 
show, make “remarkable progress,” convince the therapists and 
parole board of their reformed character, are released, and pick up 
where they left before they entered prison [Hare 1998].10
(Hare 2003, 158)
It is difficult to see such a narrative as anything else than incongruent 
with scientific standards, and thus, at best, anecdotal. Not only does the 
PCL-R cite the Salekin (2002) study, but it fails to acknowledge it as 
compelling, which, of course, is odd given that the study is a substantial 
peer-reviewed survey of the research literature. If extensive reviews and 
meta-analyses are not compelling scientific evidence, what is? Further, the 
literature raised in support of this alternative perspective in the PCL-R 
manual includes an extensive discussion of the study by Rice, Harris and 
Cormier (1992). We must assume, then, that the creators of the PCL-R, 
at the time of writing, were unaware of the fact that two to three years 
earlier to publication, a class action had been raised against the institu-
tion where Rice, Harris and Cormier (1992) collected their data, making 
public a mountain of evidence about disturbing psychiatric malpractices 
at Oak Ridge Social Therapy Unit.
For the past five to 10 years, however, a comparatively clearer, nuanced, 
and more optimistic picture about psychopathy and treatment has started 
to take shape. First, a few years after Salekin (2002), a review was pub-
lished by D’Silva et al. (2004) that specifically sought to investigate the 
hypothesized adverse effects of treatment associated with the PCL-R 
diagnosis. The team systematically evaluated 24 studies and found that, 
above all, the aggregate of research was in such a condition that it was 
poorly equipped to answer their basic question about adverse effect (e.g., 
lack of control groups, lack of methodological rigor, poor data quality). 
They argued that, when researchers actually do draw the conclusion that 
psychopathy is related to adverse treatment outcomes (i.e. untreatabil-
ity), such an interpretation amounts to a “logical error” (D’Silva et al. 
2004, 175). Therefore, they expressed regret about the common prac-
tice that diagnosed psychopaths “are now being denied treatment on the 
basis that they are either untreatable or that treatment might make them 
worse” (D’Silva et al. 2004, 175).
Less than a decade after the publication of Salekin (2002) and D’Silva 
et al. (2004), a review study by Salekin, Worley and Grimes (2010) 
stressed a number of salient points. First, although they saw emerging 
developments in the field toward addressing the unique challenges related 
to treatment of diagnosed psychopaths, the collective research effort did 
not make a “strong case for the notion that psychopathy is untreatable” 
(Salekin et al. 2010, 255). Second, there was ample evidence that (adult) 
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diagnosed psychopaths could indeed benefit significantly from standard 
treatment programs (Salekin et al. 2010, 255). Although researchers and 
practitioners still battle with overcoming the seeming unwarranted clini-
cal pessimism, the two points stressed by Salekin and colleagues (2010) 
can now be traced broadly in the research field, though it is allegedly 
still far from a prevailing viewpoint among practitioners (e.g. Sörman 
et al. 2014).
Indeed, in the most recent and detailed evaluation of the treatment 
literature, Polaschek and Skeem (2018) notice that perhaps the strongest 
barrier for scientifically answering the question about treatability is, iron-
ically, the notable “dearth of research,” perhaps propelled in part by the 
prevailing belief among both researchers and practitioners that the ques-
tion about treatability has long been answered; namely, that psychopaths 
cannot be treated (Polaschek and Skeem 2018, 710). What makes all of 
this ironic is that, instead of being a ground for neglecting treatment, 
diagnosed psychopaths should—according to canonical treatment guide-
lines—be viewed as prime targets for treatment efforts due to their com-
mon status as high-risk patients. Generally, treatment efforts are directed 
where it is likely to make an actual robust impact (i.e. the Risk-Need-
Responsivity model); namely, treatment should be aimed at individuals 
who, for example, are likely to recidivate. Naturally, high-risk patients, 
such as diagnosed psychopaths, would fall within this group (Polaschek 
and Skeem 2018, 712).
With regard to effective treatment, Polaschek and Skeem (2018) under-
line that knowledge about concrete treatment methods is so far scarce, 
but notice that there is evidence of positive treatment outcomes across 
the literature (e.g. Polaschek 2011; Skeem, Monahan, and Mulvey 2002; 
Wong et al. 2012). So, while research is certainly lacking, and, there-
fore, increased efforts should be expected to shed further light on the 
issue, Polaschek and Skeem (2018) also stress the importance of simply 
beginning to encourage and facilitate treatment efforts. Such attempts 
may “restore faith among members of the public that psychopathic indi-
viduals are not intractable threats who must be indefinitely detained,” 
promoting the view that our justice system ought to “provide access to 
rehabilitation for all adjudicated individuals in need of it” (Polaschek 
and Skeem 2018, 726).
In addition to the studies highlighted by Polaschek and Skeem (2018), 
novel approaches to treatment programs have in recent years shown 
that optimism is generally warranted. For example, Wong et al. (2012, 
2015) developed a model using the PCL-R factor scores to guide treat-
ment efforts insofar that some cognitive-behavioral treatment strategies11 
tend to be more efficient in psychopathic patients scoring high in Factor 
2 items (i.e. typical criminogenic behavioral features), suggesting “that 
psychopaths and violent offenders in general have qualitatively similar 
treatment targets” (Wong and Olver 2015, 305). Utilizing this model, 
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Sewall and Olver (2019) examined the correlation between psychopathy, 
treatment, and sexually violent recidivism in a group of men (n=302) 
and found that diagnosed psychopaths benefitted equally from treat-
ment compared to non-psychopaths (consistent with other results, e.g. 
Polaschek and Ross 2010). The authors concluded that their study “fuels 
optimism about the potential for psychopathic men to make meaningful 
risk-related changes akin to their nonpsychopathic counterparts” (Sewall 
and Olver 2019, 68). Similarly, Baskin-Sommers and Curtin and New-
man (2015) tested a training program that purported to improve robust 
deficits found in psychopaths (e.g. attention deficits), and results strongly 
indicated that psychopaths “are capable of overcoming their subtype-
specific deficits with practice and that receiving deficit-matched training 
results in generalizable change in these subtype-specific deficits” (Baskin-
Sommers, Curtin, and Newman 2015, 51). Echoing this optimism, Brazil 
et al. (2018) highlighted the somewhat commonsensical point that as 
cognitive and behavioral research progresses, and new etiological insights 
about psychopathy are disclosed, such information is expected to yield 
comparatively much more precise intervention strategies.
As has been demonstrated, the research literature is rather clear with 
respect to two main points. First, there is virtually no concrete evidence 
that the psychopathy diagnosis should be adversely correlated with treat-
ment efforts. Second, while there is significant evidence (though limited 
in scope) of successful treatment efforts, there is next to no scientifically 
based evidence in support of the thesis that psychopaths are generally 
immune to psychiatric intervention. In other words, the widespread 
untreatability view pertaining to diagnosed psychopaths is medically 
erroneous. Now, if the untreatability view is rejected by the research 
record, but forensic practitioners still maintain a widespread adherence 
to the precarious conclusions of outdated research narratives, it should 
raise a suspicion about the professional and ethical standards in the field.
Psychopathy and the Stigma of  
Yesterday’s Research
In the remainder of this contribution, ethical perspectives and issues 
related to administering the psychopathy diagnosis will be discussed with 
a special focus on the matters concerning its use as a treatment amena-
bility assessment. The aim of this final section, however, is not only to 
draw conclusions from the foregoing analysis, but also to add some gen-
eral remarks to a growing sentiment in psychopathy research of encour-
aging contributions in ethics (e.g. Edens et al. 2018; Lyon, Ogloff, and 
Shepherd 2016; Pickersgill 2009). It should be underlined, though, that 
ethical discussions in forensic psychiatry are somewhat meager due to its 
status as a relatively young field (e.g. Appelbaum 2008). More so (and 
perhaps due to its even younger status), thoughtful discussions about 
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the ethics of psychopathy research and practices is not only meager but 
next to non-existing, and a serious discourse has yet to manifest broadly 
across the paradigm (although, some admirable efforts have been made 
analyzing the role of psychopathy with respect to specific legal issues [e.g. 
Edens et al. 2018]).
Before examining the specific ethical challenges that emerge in the prac-
tice of utilizing the psychopathy diagnosis, a short comment is needed in 
order to establish what exact ethical principles we shall hold the follow-
ing discussion up against. While the American Psychiatric Association 
provides a general set of guidelines for the psychiatric profession (i.e. the 
so-called The Principles of Medical Ethics), some researchers have sought 
to amend these guidelines with crucial nuances specifically applicable to 
forensic psychiatry (for an overview, see Austin, Goble, and Kelecevic 
2009; Niveau and Welle 2018).12 For example, Paul Appelbaum (1997, 
2008) has with his so-called standard position argued that two basic 
principles in particular define the ethical obligations of forensic psychi-
atric practitioners:
The first principle is that of truth-telling; namely, that practitioners’ 
testimony must always reflect their truthful, honest opinion. But not just 
any true opinion. If that were the case, ignorant psychiatrists would then 
be able to serve any side and any objective, as long as their statement 
were genuinely believed. Rather, Appelbaum (2008) stressed that there 
is an ethical obligation for forensic psychiatrists to accurately base their 
testimony on concrete “scientific data on the subject at hand and the 
consensus of the field,” regardless of which side in the adversarial court 
system their comments may favor or disadvantage (Appelbaum 2008, 
196). At first glance, this principle sets an increasingly high standard for 
an ethical guideline, since the scientific data of psychiatric research can 
be unreliable, and its theories often non-validated and disputed, raising 
the question whether there really are scientifically truthful psychiatric 
claims. However, Applebaum holds that when psychiatric research has 
established something akin to a consensus, practitioners may report on 
such information regardless of it being robustly validated. For example, 
where different forms of psychotherapy might lack peer-reviewed valid-
ity, some practitioners and clients may still benefit from such procedures, 
making them perfectly justified in terms of ethical standards. Indeed, one 
can still do good with unestablished science.
The second principle is that of respect for persons; namely, that in the 
quest of giving truthful, scientifically accurate testimonies, forensic psy-
chiatrists must qualify their expertise so they always “respect the human-
ity of the evaluee,” refraining from engaging in “deception, exploitation, 
or needless invasion of the privacy” of the people being examined, 
reported, or testified about (Appelbaum 2008, p. 197. This principle has 
several moderating applications. For one, if this principle is not applied, 
it would then follow that practitioners could engage in any practice as 
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long as it were connected to seeking or conveying the truth; for instance, 
deceitfully exploiting an unprepared witness to get to the truth. Another 
qualification of the second principle is that of setting limits for what and 
how specific information is introduced to various stakeholders (e.g. in 
the adversarial court system). Where scientific truths might be conveyed 
with a genuine incentive, the forensic practitioner ought also to exert 
some standard awareness of, say, what potentially negative effects such 
information may have on the individual.13
With these ethical principles in mind, let us briefly consider the com-
mon practice with regards to applying the psychopathy diagnosis in 
treatment amenability processes. As mentioned, the psychopathy diag-
nosis is introduced in court or a correctional setting primarily as a way 
to provide data-driven actuarial testimonies about a patient; namely, by 
correlating and inferencing the specific patient to a reliably established 
patient class (i.e. PCL-R diagnosed psychopaths). That is, by assessing a 
patient with psychopathy (i.e. a particular PCL-R score), we can thereby, 
due to established empirical research, make an inference to the specific 
behaviors that are tested for in the research. This practice, of course, 
deviates markedly from drawing inferences based on mere “professional 
opinion.” As such, the practice of making said data-driven (i.e. actuarial) 
inferences are seemingly on par with the first principle in the standard 
position (i.e. truth-telling) since it is based on widely accepted scientific 
procedures (e.g. Serin et al. 2016).14
Notice, though, that according to the standard position the scope of 
what exactly can be inferred from a psychopathy diagnosis will be fully 
contingent on the actual peer-reviewed research. That is, the psychopa-
thy diagnosis—for example, the PCL-R assessment—can only be used as 
an inference about issues that have been tested for and validated by the 
research community. For example, it has been shown that there is a weak 
to moderate correlation between a high PCL-R score and violent recidi-
vism (e.g. Yang et al. 2010). With this knowledge in hand, a forensic psy-
chiatrist can therefore truthfully inform the court or correctional system 
of such specific probabilities and the extent to which they translate to 
the concrete case. Again, what makes such an inference truthful is simply 
that it is a scientific peer-reviewed qualified statement.
Regretfully, though, there is growing evidence that the psychopathy 
diagnosis has been used to make inferences to actuarial issues that have 
never been tested for. In a review study of how the psychopathy diag-
nosis has been introduced in court cases, Lyon, Ogloff, and Shepherd 
(2016) found a number of problematic applications; for example, one 
case in which the psychopathy diagnosis was introduced in court to argue 
that the patient (due to his high PCL-R score) was incapable of reading 
and comprehending intricate information (194). As the authors stressed, 
since there are no particular studies that test for such a hypothesis in 
the patient class, that inference is invalid. In accordance with the first 
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principle in the standard position, then, introducing such invalid refer-
ences (e.g. reading and comprehension capabilities) will thus amount to 
an instance of unethical practice due to it being scientifically untruthful.
Similarly, then, it appears clear that the use of the psychopathy diagno-
sis as a treatment amenability discriminator, specifically as an instrument 
to explicitly prohibit diagnosed psychopaths from entering rehabilita-
tion and treatment programs, fails to meet the ethical demands of the 
first principle in the standard position. As it was shown, not only is the 
evidence for the untreatability hypothesis scarcely supported, but evi-
dence of the stronger narrative about adverse effects is also insufficient. 
Instead, it was shown that the research literature has yielded increas-
ing positive evidence for treatment and intervention effects on diagnosed 
psychopaths (e.g. Polaschek 2011; Polaschek and Skeem 2018; Sewall 
and Olver 2019; Skeem, Monahan, and Mulvey 2002; Wong et al. 2012). 
As a minimum, it is safe to say that there is no established consensus that 
psychopaths are untreatable.
Moreover, the case for unethical practices might be stronger than a 
mere misinformation to the court and correctional institutions. Not only 
does the practice of treatment discrimination fail on the first principle 
(i.e. truth-telling), but it also appears to fail on the second principle (i.e. 
respect for persons). Indeed, the patients in question are not offered the 
treatment they rightfully need. This omission effectively eclipses the 
broader standing guidelines of administering psychiatric intervention; 
namely, that high-risk patients are fundamentally high-priority individu-
als (i.e., the Risk-Need-Responsivity model). Arguably, such practices are 
not only problematic from the patient’s perspective (i.e. his/her well-being 
is neglected), but, from the perspective of the greater good of society, 
such practices effectively increase social risks, as high-profile dangerous 
individuals are eventually released back into society without a proper 
attempt at rehabilitating treatment.
In addition to this deeper ethical suspicion, it is perhaps worth noticing 
that the psychiatric pessimism that appears to frame practitioners’ deal-
ings with psychopaths does not only boil down to a question of actual 
treatment, but may amount to a kind of harmful stigma. Its effects may 
transport deeply into the judicial system, well beyond the psychiatrist–
patient relationship. Indeed, the belief that psychopaths are unlikely to 
rehabilitate, or, so to speak, are untreatable, seems to also have stabilized 
among lay people. For example, in a survey of people attending jury duty 
(n=400), Smith, Edens, Clark, and Rulseh (2014) found that respond-
ents were generally doubtful about whether criminal psychopaths could 
successfully rehabilitate back into society, and remained largely unde-
cided about the scenario of curing or treating psychopaths (Smith, Edens, 
Clark, and Rulseh 2014, 496). Although one might argue that lay peo-
ple are outside of the proper forensic psychiatric concern, there are rea-
sons to treat such findings seriously. Indeed, non-experts are importantly 
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involved in everything from jury duty to parole decisions to the forming 
of public policies, which makes them central stakeholders for forensic 
psychiatrists.
Speaking to this suspicion of a broader stigmatizing effect of the 
untreatability narrative, Edens et al. (2018) noted that many key deci-
sions in the legal system (e.g. parole decisions, capital sentencing, insti-
tutional placement, permanent detention) rest pointedly on evaluating 
whether the patient will be dangerous in the future. When a high-risk 
patient is assessed with psychopathy and, therefore, considered psychiat-
rically untreatable (as opposed to treatable), it is not far-fetched to sug-
gest that this is taken to imply the aggravating notion that such a person is 
highly unlikely to change, let alone be responsive to correctional restraint 
and deterrence, and thus represents as a chronic future institutional and 
social risk (for similar perspectives, see DeMatteo et al. 2014a, 2014b; 
Edens, Davis, Smith, and Guy 2013).
In sum, there are good reasons why we should be ethically worried 
about the practice of introducing the psychopathy diagnosis for treat-
ment amenability purposes. One, it is insufficiently based in scientific 
research. Second, it seems to violate the respect psychiatrists ought to 
have for their patients, unjustifiably stripping patients of serious reha-
bilitation efforts (with potential harm to them and the broader society). 
In addition, we may speculate that the untreatability perspective trans-
ports unto judges and jurors an aggravating, stigmatizing perspective 
of chronic antisocial behaviors, unloading extrajudicial, unfair hurdles 
unto the patient’s process in the judicial and correctional system (i.e. the 
probative value of a PCL-R assessment is outweighed by the prejudicial 
effects).
In light of such a conclusion, we might ask what ought to be done 
in forensic psychiatry to alleviate this seemingly unethical procedure. 
Although one obvious recommendation is to stop using the psychopathy 
diagnosis in treatment amenability assessments, there might be reasons to 
suggest more critical and wider ranging recommendations. In their recent 
article, which surveyed a handful of important legal and ethical issues 
related to psychopathy and violence risk assessment, Edens et al. (2018) 
concluded with a critical question; namely, whether forensic psychiatrists 
should “abandon the use of psychopathy assessments, particularly PCL-R 
scores, to influence decision making” in court and correctional settings, 
given a growing evidence of forensic misuse and limited scientific validity. 
Their question seems to signal a growing skepticism in the field about the 
broader motivations and incentives behind the use of the psychopathy 
diagnosis, as well as a scientifically critical attitude toward the alleged 
truths communicated by the diagnosis. Perhaps it is time for the field 
to stop and more profoundly take status of the research and practices 
regarding the psychopathy diagnosis. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that, although researchers might find it unproblematic to study this 
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alleged pathology through their lenses in the ivory tower, the nuances 
and complexities that immerse this diagnostic category are precariously 
lost in the adversarial process of court and correctional settings.
Notes
 1. Larsen, Rasmus. “Psychopathy Treatment and the Stigma of Yesterday’s 
Research.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 29 (3). pp. 247–272. © 2019 
Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hop-
kins University Press.
 2. I would like to acknowledge the reviewers for their constructive feedback, 
which led to substantial improvements of the initial manuscript. All potential 
mistakes are entirely my own.
 3. Notice that when researchers pursue the view that psychopathy is not 
homogenous, but instead a heterogenous construct that covers over several 
subtypes, these subtypes are then hypothesized to make up a homogenous 
(sub)class, with one or more discrete etiologies.
 4. For an example of how to estimate the extent of false positive in diagnosis, 
see van Stralen et al. (2009).
 5. Ironically, the first person to suggest the existence of the psychopathy diag-
nosis, the American polymath Benjamin Rush, was rather optimistic about 
the role of the psychiatrist, professing that medical insight into this disorder 
eventually would contribute to eradicating social evils at large (Rush, 1972, 
37 [first published in 1786]).
 6. Hare is here paraphrasing a well-known quote from Suedfeld and Landon 
(1978).
 7. In an official statement, Judge Perell said: “I appreciate that apart from pro-
fessional renown and advancement, there was no self-serving gratification 
for the Defendant physicians at the expense of the Plaintiffs [but] it is a 
breach of a physician’s ethical duty to physically and mentally torture his 
patients even if the physician’s decisions are based on what the medical pro-
fession at the time counts for treatment for the mentally ill” (Fine, 2017).
 8. One study has reported adverse effects associated with specific PCL-R traits 
(i.e. Factor 1), although adverse effects were not correlated with the total 
PCL-R score (Hare, Clark, Grann, and Thornton 2000). This finding, how-
ever, has not been replicated. For the opposite findings; namely, that the same 
PCL-R traits can be associated with positive treatment outcomes, see Burt, 
Olver, and Wong (2016). Another study found indications of adverse effects 
(Seto and Barbaree 1999). This study, however, was later retracted after a 
follow-up study (Barbaree 2005).
 9. However, there were some attempts at reviewing the treatment literature 
before Salekin (2002). For instance, a study by Garrido, Esteban and Molero 
(1995) reported on two separate meta-analyses, though without providing 
the needed detail on references and methods. A book by Dolan and Coid 
(1993) offered a comprehensive review of the treatment literature and con-
cluded that the collective research suffered from lack of stable diagnostic 
criteria, had problematic sampling procedures, ill-described treatment pro-
cesses, and an unsystematic measure of treatment outcomes, making it diffi-
cult to draw any scientifically meaningful conclusions. For a similar portrayal 
of the research efforts before Salekin (2002), see Harris and Rice (2006).
 10. For what it is worth, the reference included at the end of this quote from 
the PCL-R manual is to Hare (1998), a book chapter that includes a 
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three-paragraph section titled “Recidivism Following Treatment.” In this 
section, Hare includes an extensive discussion of the study by Rice and col-
leagues (1992).
 11. For an anthology on cognitive-behavioral treatment, see Kazantzis, Rei-
necke, and Freeman (2010).
 12. Notice that forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty in psychiatry insofar as the 
profession deals with mental functioning and behavior in legal and correc-
tional settings (Bloom and Schneider 2016). Although the concrete role of 
a forensic psychiatrist can vary, it typically involves providing non-trivial 
information to the court and correctional settings, assisting the evaluation 
of fitness to stand trial, responsibility, sentencing, institutional placement, 
parole decisions, treatment, rehabilitation, etc. (e.g. Bloom & Schneider 
2016, 693–718).
 13. While the standard position has been broadly endorsed by practitioners and 
theorists, it is not without its strong critics. Alan Stone (2008) has argued 
that the standard position can never claim any neutral ethical worth. For 
instance, as Stone argued, due to the adversarial system in a court setting, 
forensic psychiatrists are bound to deliver statements that can potentially be 
both good and bad for the patient in question. As Stone puts it: “Psychia-
trists are immediately over the [ethical] boundary when they go into court” 
(Stone 2008, 168).
 14. This is not necessarily an unproblematic claim. Although the forensic psy-
chiatric profession is ethically challenging (in both practical and theoreti-
cal affairs), we might here stress that it is not obvious that actuarial data 
meet the standard of “truth telling.” Indeed, actuarial science is inherently 
uncertain due to its probabilistic nature. As one reviewer of this contribution 
pointed out, maybe the overall actuarial data on diagnosed psychopaths is 
simply too weak to make any truthful assertions about the patient class (this 
concern is also raised in Serin et al. 2016). Such a reservation would be even 
stronger if we weigh in the possibility of large-scale false positives within the 
PCL-R patient class (e.g. Larsen 2018).
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